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This paper was originally written as a contribution to a research project on 'The 
Hierarchy and Sources of EC Law’, directed by Prof.Dr. Gerd Winter, Zentrum 
fur Europaische Rechtspolitik (ZERP) an der Universitat Bremen, and financed 
by the European Parliament. It will also appear in a collective publication: Gerd 
Winter (ed.), Reforming the Categories and Hierarchy of EC Legal Acts, to be 
published in 1995. The author wishes to express his gratitude to the editor for 
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I INTRODUCTION
The legal system of the European Union (EU)* 1 embraces numerous types of 
norms. Some of these norms are legally binding, while others have legal effects 
of a different kind or are without legal force. This second group of norms 
comprises ’rules of conduct which, in principle, have no legally binding force but
Professor of European Community Law, European University Institute, Florence; 
Professor of Law, College of Europe, Bruges; Honorary Visiting Professor of Law, University 
College London. The author wishes to thank Vassil Breskovski, Emir Lawless, Wolf Sauter, 
Anne-Lise Strahtmann, Angela Ward and Gerd Winter for their contributions to this paper. 
He alone of course is responsible for its content and conclusions.
1 The expression European Union (EU) is used here to denote the ensemble established 
by the Maastricht Treaty. The expression European Community (EC) is used, where 




























































































which nevertheless may have practical effects'.2 It thus constitutes EU soft law.
EU soft law varies enormously in character. It ranges from specific acts such 
as recommendations as provided in Article 189 EC to very general Commission 
communications which serve as statements of legal policy. While most of these 
acts are the product of a single institution or author, some are generated by two 
or more EC or European Community (EC) institutions acting together. The 
latter are commonly known as interinstitutional agreements or joint declarations.
Though not provided in Article 189 EC, interinstitutional agreements have long 
been used in the EC. In recent years, however, they have increased rapidly in 
number. Not only have they been employed as a means of establishing basic 
institutional arrangements and stating fundamental values. They also raise 
significant issues of EU constitutional law, which should be addressed at the 
1996 Intergovernmental Conference.
This report examines these interinstitutional agreements and joint declarations 
and the main legal issues raised by their use. For the sake of convenience, the 
expression 'interinstitutional agreement' is used to denote acts which are 
designated formally either as an 'interinstitutional agreement' or as a 'joint 
declaration'.
The report is divided into five main parts. The next part (II) provides a
2 Snyder, 'The Effectiveness of European Community Law: Institutions, Processes, Tools 
and Techniques', (1993) 56 Modem Law Review 19 at 32. For a more detailed definition, 
emphasising the intention of the drafters of the norms, see Wellens and Borchardt, 'Soft Law 




























































































chronology and an overview of examples of agreements. The following part 
(III) considers alternative ways of classifying agreements and proposes a set of 
criteria designed to produce a coherent typology. A subsequent part (IV) 
analyses the extent to which interinstitutional agreements are legally binding or 
have legal effect. A following part (V) sets forth briefly some relevant 
constitutional requirements and limits. The final main part (VI) advances some 
proposals for reform. A brief conclusion (VII) summarises the discussion.
II CHRONOLOGY AND OVERVIEW OF EXAMPLES
It is difficult to know the number of interinstitutional agreements exactly. What 
counts as an interinstitutional agreement, especially in the past, is not always 
clear; not all agreements have been published in the Official Journal: and no 
comprehensive list of agreements seems ever to have been compiled.3 In 
addition, the academic literature on the subject reflects the characteristics of 
interinstitutional agreements themselves: it is on the whole relatively recent, 
rather sparse, and far from encyclopaedic in coverage.4 Nevertheless, by
3 In 1973 a Commission communication gave a list of agreements between the 
Commission and the European Parliament: see Commission of the European Communities', 
'Mesures pratiques destinées à réaliser le renforcement des pouvoirs de contrôle du Parlement 
et à améliorer les rapports entre cette Institution et la Commission', Communication de la 
Commission, 30 mai 1973, COM(73)999 (1973), Annex I. Quite apart from the fact that this 
list is limited solely to agreements between the European Parliament and the Commission, 
there is no way of verifying whether the list is is comprehensive or not, and in particular 
whether it includes all agreements ever entered into between the two institutions or simply 
those which were in operation in 1973.
4 Among sources dealing with more than one agreement, the following (in chronological 
order) are the most useful for the present purposes: Vergés, 'De quelques méthodes de 
développement institutionnel des Communautés européennes', in Mélanges offerts à Paul 
Reuter. Î e droit international: unité et diversité. Paris, Pedone, 1980, pp 501-517; Jacqué, 




























































































combining these various sources, it is possible to present a rough chronology 
and to gain an overview of interinstitutional agreements. A list of 
interinstitutional agreements to date is given in the Appendix.
The earliest agreements were very informal in origin and expression.5 They 
derived mostly from an exchange of letters or a letter or a declaration in 
response to a claim, usually by the European Parliament to participate in 
decision-making. Examples include:
-the 'Luns' procedure concerning European Parliament participation in the 
conclusion of asssociation agreements,6
-the Westerterp' procedure concerning European Parliament participation in the 
conclusion of commercial agreements,7
institutionnelle communautaire', in R. Bieber and Georg Ress (Hrsg.), Die Dvnamik des 
Europaischen Gemeinschaftsrechts / The Dynamics of EC-law. Baden-Baden, Nomos, 1987), 
pp 377-406; Waelbroeck, M. and D. Waelbroeck, 'Les "déclarations communes" en tant 
qu'instruments d'un accroissement des compétences du Parlement européen', in Jean-Victor 
Louis and Denis Waelbroeck (sous la direction de), Le Parlement européen dans l'évolution 
institutionnelle. Brussels, Editions de l'Université de Bruxelles, 1988, pp 79-103; Bieber, Pas 
Verfahrensrecht von Verfassunsorganen. Baden-Baden, Nomos, 1992); Wellens and Borchardt, 
'Soft Law in European Community Law', (1989) 14 ELRev 267; Bieber, 'The Settlement of 
Institutional Conflicts on the Basis of Article 4 of the EEC Treaty', (1994) 31 CMLRev 505; 
Monar, 'Interinstitutional Agreements: The Phenomenon and its New Dynamics after 
Maastricht', (1994) 31 CMLRev 693; Reich, 'La mise en oeuvre du Traité sur l'Union 
européenne par les accords interinstitutionnels', (1994) 375 Revue du Marché commun et le 
Union européenne 81.
5 On this phase, see especially Vergés, 'De quelques méthodes de développement 
institutionnel des Communautés européennes', in Mélanges offerts à Paul Reuter. Le droit 
international: unité et diversité. Paris, Pedone, 1980, pp 501-517; and Jacqué, 'La pratique des 
institutions communautaires et le développement de la structure institutionnelle 
communautaire', in R. Bieber and Georg Ress (Hrsg.), Die Dvnamik des Europâischen 
Gemeinschaftsrechts / The Dynamics of EC-law. Baden-Baden, Nomos, 1987), pp 377-406;
6 Minutes of the Council of 24 and 25 February 1964, S/861/63 (not published). See 
also Simmonds, 'The Evolution of the External Relations Law of the European Community' 
(1979) 28 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 644 at 648.





























































































-the Commission's commitment to inform Parliament about the follow up of 
parliamentary initiatives,8
-consultation of Parliament by the Council in cases not provided for in the EEC 
Treaty9 and
-the Council's commitment to inform Parliament about the follow-up given to 
its opinion.10
A second phase involved the issue of joint declarations.11 They were the product 
of three rather than only two institutions, and in one case even concerned the 
representatives of the Member States. Joint declarations were more formal than 
the early agreements, being the result of negotiation between and approval by 
the participating institutions, being designed usually to establish a more or less 
complex procedure, taking the form of a specific document, and being published 
in the Official Journal. Examples include:
-the Joint Declaration of 4 March 1975 of the European Parliament, the Council 
and the Commission on the conciliation procedure in budgetary matters,12 
-the Joint Declaration of 5 April 1977 by the European Parliament, the Council 
and the Commission on Fundamental Rights,13
-the Joint Declaration of 30 June 1982 by the European Parliament, the Council 
and the Commission on various measures to improve the budgetary procedure,14 
and
-the Joint Declaration of 11 June 1986 by the European Parliament, the Council,
8 Embodied in a letter of 3 March 1984; see Jacqué, ibid, at 388.
9 Based on a declaration of the chairman of the Council; see also Jacqué, ibid, at 389.
10 Based on letters of the chairmen of the Council; see Jacqué, ibid, at 389.
11 On this phase, see especially Jacqué, 'La pratique des institutions communautaires et 
le développement de la structure institutionnelle communautaire', in R. Bieber and Georg Ress 
(Hrsg.), Die Dvnamik des Europaischen Gemeinschaftsrechts / The Dynamics of EC-law. 
Baden-Baden, Nomos, 1987), pp 377-406; and Waelbroeck, M. and D. Waelbroeck, 'Les 
"déclarations communes" en tant qu'instruments d'un accroissement des compétences du 
Parlement européen', in Jean-Victor Louis and Denis Waelbroeck (sous la direction de), Le 
Parlement européen dans l'évolution institutionnelle. Brussels, Editions de l’Université de 
Bruxelles, 1988, pp 79-103.
12 OJ 1975 C89/1.
13 OJ 1977 C103/1.




























































































the Representatives of the Member States meeting within the Council, and the 
Commission on Racism and Xenophobia.15
A third phase involved the conclusion of interinstitutional agreements or 
declarations. Examples include:
-the Inter-institutional Agreement of 29 June 1988 between the European 
Parliament, the Council and the Commission on budgetary discipline and 
improvement of the budgetary procedure,16
-the Interinstitutional Declaration of 25 October 1993 of the European 
Parliament, the Council and the Commission on democracy, transparency and 
subsidiarity,17
-the Interinstitutional Agreement on procedures for implementing the principle 
of subsidiarity,18
-the Decision of the European Parliament on the regulations and general 
conditions governing the Ombudsman's duties,19
-the Arrangements for the proceedings of the Conciliation Committee under 
Article 189B regarding the co-decision procedure,20
-the Interinstitutional Agreement of 29 October 1993 of the European 
Parliament, the Council and the Commission on budgetary discipline and 
improvement of the budgetary procedure,21 and
-the Interinstitutional Agreement of 20 December 1994 of the European 
Parliament, the Council and the Commission on the consolidation of Community 
law, concluded at the Interinstitutional Conference.22
15 OJ 1986 C158/1.
16 OJ 1988 LI 85/33. This was the first use of the designation 'interinstitutional 
agreement'; it was published in the L series of the Official Journal.
17 OJ 1993 C329/133, also in Europe, no. 1857, 4 November 1993, p 1.
18 OJ 1993 C329/135: the reference is to the draft Agreement which is to be adopted by 
each institution according to its internal procedures.
19 OJ 1993 C329/136: the reference is the draft decision to be adopted by each institution 
according to its internal procedures.
20 OJ 1993 C329/141.
21 OJ 1993 C351/1.
22 See Europe, no. 6402 (n.s.), Friday 20 Jan 95 p 12; see also European Parliament, 
Committee on Legal Affairs and Citizens' Rights, Report on an interinstitutional agreement 
on official codification of Community legislation (Rapporteur: Jean-Pierre Cot) (European 




























































































Of these agreements, the 29 June 1988 Agreement on budgetary discipline 
followed the entry into force of Single European Act, while the others were 
adopted to implement the Maastricht Treaty. Again, these agreements involved 
the three principal non-judicial institutions, and they were mainly formal in 
character. Virtually all shared the distinctive feature that they were intended 
expressly to implement specific Treaty provisions, namely the institutional 
reforms in the Maastricht Treaty on European Union.
Amidst the current proliferation of interinstitutional agreements, a number of 
agreements are still at draft and negotiation stage. They include:
-the Draft Interinstitutional Agreement on the rules for implementing [the 
conciliation committee in the co-decision procedure],23
-the proposed Interinstitutional Agreement aimed at making the Treaty revision 
procedure more democratic and more transparent,24
-the Commission proposal of 11 May 1992 for a Joint Declaration in respect of 
the Intellectual Property Aspects of Scientific and Technological Cooperation 
Agreements with Third Countries,25
-the draft interinstitutional agreement of December 1993 sent by the European 
Parliament to the Council and the Commission on the implementation of the 
Common Foreign and Security Policy,
-the draft interinstitutional agreement of December 1993 sent by the European 
Parliament to the Council and the Commission on the application of Title VI 
TEU (Cooperation in the fields of Justice and Home Affairs), and 
-the draft interinstitutional agreement of December 1993 sent by the European
23 European Commission, SEC(94)645 final, Brussels, 19.4.94
24 See Europe, no. 6413 (ns), 4 February 1995, p 4.
25 Commission of the European Communities, Proposal for a Joint Declaration of the 
Council and the Commission in respect of negotiations concerning the IPR aspects of 
agreements for scientific and technological cooperation between the European Community and 
third countries, Communication from the Commission to the Council, COM(92)202 final 




























































































Parliament on the implementation of Economic and Monetary Union.26
Ill TYPOLOGY
In order to be able to assess these agreements from a constitutional standpoint, 
it is helpful to classify them according to a coherent typology. It has been 
remarked that '[t]hese quasi-constitutional instruments are difficult to classify in 
law. They are unlikely to fall into a single legal category. The circumstances 
of each case form the only basis on which to determine whether the States or the 
institutions really intended to enter into a legal commitment or whether they had 
no objective other than to publish a declaration of political intent and lay down 
guidelines'.27 Today, however, it is time to determine the criteria for classifying 
these agreements; this exercise is neither ad hoc nor futile. Now there are more 
agreements on the basis of which to arrive at a classification scheme. In 
addition, the proliferation of agreements, together with the increasing complexity 
of the EU legal system, have rendered the question of their constitutional and 
legal status more acute.
26 On the last three, see Monar, 'Interinstitutional Agreements: The Phenomenon and its 
New Dynamics after Maastricht', (1994) 31 CMLRev 693 at 716-718. See also, e.g., 
European Parliament, Report of the Committee on Institutional Affairs on the conclusion and 
adaptation [sic] of interinstitutional agreements (Rapporteur: Mr Panayotis Roumeliotis), 
European Parliament, Session Documents, A3-0043/93, 2 February 1993; European 
Parliament, Report of the Committee on Civil Liberties and Internal Affairs on participation 
by the European Parliament in international agreements by the Member States and the Union 
on cooperation in the fields of justice and home affairs (Rapporteur Mr Georg 
Jarzembowski), European Parliament, Session Documents, A3-0436/93, 21 December 1993.
27 Bernhardt, 'The Sources of Community Law: The 'Constitution' of the Community', 
in Commission of the European Communities, Thirty Years of Community Law. Luxembourg, 




























































































Among the possible criteria for classifying agreements are (a) formal 
designation, (b) identity of the participating institutions, (c) when the agreement 
was made, (d) subject matter, (e) legal basis and (f) intention of the participating 
institutions with regard to legal effect, supplemented if necessary by other 
factors. Each criterion may be briefly evaluated.
(a) The formal designation, while not irrelevant, is the least useful criteria. 
Early agreements often had no formal designation, while subsequently the 
designations 'joint declaration' and 'interinstitutional agreement' were used 
seriatim and without regard for example to the fact that the designation 'joint 
declaration' also covered a host of other, quite different accords. Of equal 
importance from the constitutional standpoint, the formal designation of an act 
is not determinative of its nature even in the case of legally binding EC acts.28
(b) The identify of the participating institutions is also of little importance in 
distinguishing between agreements within the broad category of EU soft law 
being considered here. All three main legislative institutions, namely the 
European Parliament, the Council and the Commission, are involved in almost 
all agreements except for the early ones.
(c) The criterion of when an agreement was made emphasises the relation of 
a text to the different phases of EC/EU development.29 As already seen, it 
points to important, if not determinative features, of specific historical contexts. 
It does not however provide a convincing basis for distinguishing among
28 See Case 41-44/70 International Fruit Company v Commission [1971] ECR 411.
29 Cf Monar, 'Interinstitutional Agreements: The Phenomenon and its New Dynamics 




























































































agreements which might help us to assess their constitutional implications at the 
present time.
(d) If subject matter is used as a criterion, almost half of the total current or 
proposed agreements (11 out of 24) concern legislative procedure. The next 
largest category (4) concerns the budgetary procedure; it can be seen as a subset 
of the first category. This criterion thus reveals lacunae in the EU system, as 
perceived by the European Parliament. The main initiator of agreements, the 
European Parliament has used soft law to improve an institutional position which 
from the standpoint of hard law was weak or severely constrained.30 
Nevertheless, subject matter is too blunt a criterion to group the agreements into 
coherent categories. In addition, its constitutional relevance is limited unless 
subject matter refers expressly or implicitly to another criterion such as legal 
basis or whether the subject matter is substantive or procedural in nature.
(e) Legal basis as a criterion may be taken in either of two senses. On the 
one hand, agreements may be classified into different groups if they are based 
on different articles of the Treaty ; this is legal basis in the sense of the duty to 
state reasons as required by Article 190 EC. On the other hand, agreements may 
be classified into different groups according to whether they derive directly from 
a Treaty provision or not; this refers to whether or not the Treaty provides, more 
or less expressly, for the conclusion of an agreement to achieve a specific
30 As stated by Alman Metten MEP in the debate on the Roumeliotis report, 'honesty 
requires us to admit that when we talk about interinstitutional agreements ... we are talking 
about things that we would have preferred to see dealt with in the Community Treaties 
themselves. As far as we are concerned, therefore, these agreements are an attempt to retrieve 
what we have unfortunately been unable to make legally binding, because we have never been 
a genuine partner in the negotiations on the drafting of the Treaties.' See Debates of the 





























































































For the present purposes, the first sense is not useful because most of the 
agreements would be outside a classification scheme based upon it. With regard 
to the second sense, however, a recent writer has argued that it is an appropriate 
criterion for classifying interinstitutional agreements.31 He suggests that there 
are two groups of agreements: those provided for explicitly by Treaty provisions, 
and those which lack an express Treaty basis. On this ground, he draws 
tentative conclusions regarding the legal status of the agreements. In his view, 
agreements in the first group constitute hard law, in that they are 'legally 
binding’32 or 'fully binding under Community law (hard law).'33 Those in the 
second group have a legal status somewhere "'in between" a mere political 
undertaking and a plain legal obligation (soft law).'34
Though such a political analysis can be extremely fruitful, it may be suggested 
that its tentative conclusions could usefully be revised from a legal standpoint. 
It may also suggested that what counts as 'legally binding' or 'fully binding 
under Community law' is a highly complex concept, even for those acts which 
are expressly provided in Article 189 EC. This is not to mention, for example, 
the case law of the European Court of Justice with regard to the effectiveness 
of EC law,35 or the differentiated types of acts which may be taken within the
31 Monar, 'Interinstitutional Agreements: The Phenomenon and its New Dynamics after 
Maastricht’, (1994) 31 CMLRev 693 at 687-703.
32 Ibid, at 697.
33 Ibid, at 703.
34 Ibid, at 703, see also 699.
35 See Snyder, 'The Effectiveness of European Community Law: Institutions, Processes, 




























































































framework of the EC Treaty regarding Economic and Monetary Union.36
It may further be suggested that the example of the internal rules of procedure 
of the EC/EU institutions provides a useful analogue for purposes of 
comparison.37 38 These internal rules are based expressly on the Treaty, but they 
do not always have legal force in the sense of imposing legal obligations erga 
omnes. Nor can they always be relied upon as a sword in the European courts, 
and it is unlikely that they would all be subject to an Article 173 EC action for 
annulment. Instead, as the European Court of First Instance has held:
'It is necessary to distinguish between those provisions of an institution's 
Rules of Procedure whose infringement may not be relied upon by natural 
and legal persons because they are concerned solely with the internal 
working arrangements of the institution and cannot affect their legal 
situation and those whose infringement may be relied upon because ... 
they create rights and are a factor contributing to legal certainty for such 
persons.
With these factors in mind, it would appear that the legal basis, in the sense of 
whether the use of an agreement is provided more or less expressly by the 
Treaty or not, is not entirely satisfactory as a criterion for classifying 
agreements.
(f) Instead it may be suggested that a suitable criterion consists of the intention
36 See Snyder, ’EMU -Metaphor for European Union? Institutions, Rules and Types of 
Regulation', in R. Dehousse (ed), Europe after Maastricht: An Ever Closer Union?. Munich, 
Law Books in Europe, 1994, pp 63-99.
37 Especially since it may argued that the legality of interinstitutional agreements 'can be 
derived from the power of each institution to adopt rules of procedure': see Winter, 
'Introduction', in G. Winter (ed), Reforming the Category and Hierarchy of EC Legal Acts 
[draft, typescript at 8].
38 Joined Cases T-79/89, T-84-86/89, T-91-92/89, T-94/89, T-96/89, T-98/89, T-102/89 




























































































of the drafters, supplemented as necessary in specific cases by the requirement 
of judicial review. The 'intention of the drafters' refers to the intention of the 
signatory institutions with regard to the legal force, if any, of the agreement and 
the extent and nature of its legal effects. The supplementary factor is meant to 
encompass the possibility that, regardless of the intention of the drafters, the 
agreement may in specific instances create rights, impose obligations or have 
other legal effects, for example with regard to third parties; such instances 
should not be limited to the intention of the drafters and instead should be 
delimited as necessary by judicial review. Thus interinstitutional agreements may 
have (or lack) legal effects which require to be determined in each instance by 
considering the intention of the signatory institutions, viewed in the light of the 
case law of the European courts.
This criteria is attractive for several reasons. First, it is consistent with the 
emphasis on the intention of the drafters or signatories which is fundamental 
importance in public international law. The latter, in turn, forms part of the 
legal substratum of EU law, especially with regard to soft law.39
Second, it adapts the classic public international law test to the specific features 
of the EU system, in particular the role of the individual and the unique status 
of the European Courts. These factors help to distinguish the EU from most if 
not all other treaty-based legal orders.
Third, this criteria permits an analysis to be made in each specific case 
concerning such issues as to whether (a) an agreement is legally binding in the





























































































sense that it has legal force as between the signatory institutions, (b) specific 
provisions of the agreement create legal effects vis-à-vis third parties and what 
legal effects are involved, (c) the failure on the part of the signatory institutions 
to follow a provision of the agreement can be challenged by a third party, (d) 
either specific provisions or the agreement as a whole can be the subject of an 
action of annulment by a third party, and (e) the agreement by itself can serve 
as a basis for reviewing the legality of other EU or EC acts. These issues are 
analytically distinct, and it may be suggested that they are best analysed 
separately.
IV LEGAL EFFECTS
To have legal effects does not necessarily mean to be legally binding erga 
omnes. in the sense of an EC regulation or of a law in the popular sense of the 
word. The two poles of the spectrum may be illustrated by reference to the case 
law of the European Court of Justice. It is important to bear in mind that not 
all agreements have been discussed by an advocate-general or by the Court 
itself. Even when an agreement is mentioned, the question of its legal effects, 
if any, is usually not addressed directly.
At one extreme is the 1977 Joint Declaration on Fundamental Rights.40 The 
European Court of Justice has treated it essentially as a restatement and 
reinforcement of principles the legal force of which derives from other sources,




























































































and thus without really any independent legal effects of its own.41 It thus serves 
mainly as a source of information and an aid to interpretation of legally binding
acts.42
At the other extreme are agreements concerning the budgetary procedure, which 
are the agreements most frequently discussed in the case law so far. For 
example, with regard to the Joint Declaration of 30 June 1982, the European 
Court of Justice has stated that 'the problems regarding the delimitation of non- 
compulsory expenditure in relation to compulsory expenditure are the subject of 
an interinstitutional conciliation procedure set up by the Joint Declaration ... and 
... are capable of being resolved in that context.43 In a later case Advocate- 
General Mancini concluded that:
'documents of that type: ... (b) express the general principle according to 
which Community institutions are bound by a duty of mutual loyalty and 
cooperation; (c) may, if the obligations which result from them are 
sufficiently precise and unconditional, achieve the status of measures 
intended to implement the Treaty and render any derived provisions 
conflicting with them subject to annulment.'44
Note that this Declaration is relatively unlegalistic in its language.
41 Case 44/79 Hauer v Land Rheinland-Pfalz [1979] ECR 3727 at 3745 [para 15]; Case 
222/84 Johnston v Chief Constable of the Roval Ulster Constabulary [1986] ECR 1651 at 
1682 [para 18],
42 See also Rudolf Bernhardt, 'The Sources of Community Law: The 'Constitution' of the 
Community', pp 69-82 in Commission of the European Communities, Thirty Years of 
Community Law. Luxembourg, Office of Official Publications of the European Communities, 
1983 at 80.
43 Case 34/86 Council v European Parliament [1986] ECR 2155 at 2212 [para 51].
44 Case 204/86 Greece v Council [1988] ECR 5323 at 5349. See also his observations 





























































































In contrast, the 1988 Interinstitutional Agreement on budgetary discipline states 
inter alia that 'budgetary discipline under the Interinstitutional Agreement... is 
binding on all the institutions involved for as long as the Agreement is in 
force'.45 A budgetary expert (not a lawyer) describes it as having given 'une 
base contractuelle à la mise en oeuvre du droit budgétaire européen; il constitute 
le véritable cadre de l'exercice du pouvoir budgétaire au sein de la Communauté.'
He concludes nevertheless that the Agreement 'n'a pas de véritable portée 
juridique'; it cannot replace the Treaty provisions, which provide the framework 
within which the Agreement operates and without which it would lack real 
effect.46 It may be suggested, however, that an agreement, in particular this one, 
may operate on the basis of and within the framework of Treaty provisions and 
at the same time should be recognised as having legal force in the sense of 
being legally binding upon, and legally enforceable among, the signatory 
institutions.
It thus may be suggested that to have legal effects may imply any or all of the 
following: (a) to express general principles of EU or EC law, (b) to provide a 
normative focus for argument and conflict,47 (c) to provide a normative (and 
potentially legal) framework for negotiations,48 (d) to create expectations of 
conduct49 which may constrain institutional discretion and in some cases create 
legitimate expectations in the legal sense on the part of other signatory 
institutions, (e) to concretise the duty of interinstitutional cooperation as derived
45 Paragraph I Basic Principles of the Agreement, subpara 3, OJ 1988 L185/33.
46 Terrasse, I.e budget de la Communauté européenne. Paris, Masson, 1991, at 14 
[original emphasis omitted],
47 Terrasse, I £  budget de la Communauté européenne. Paris, Masson, 1991, at 68.
48 Cf. Wellens and Borchardt, 'Soft Law in European Community Law', (1989) 14




























































































from Article 4 EEC: (f) to supply rules which are legally binding upon and 
between the signatory institutions,50 (g) to meet the threshold of locus standi and 
thus provide a basis for judicial review, (h) to be capable of being the object of 
an action for annulment under Article 173 EC, (i) to be capable of being used 
as a sword or a shield in litigation, (j) to serve as source of information and an 
aid in judicial interpretation, (k) to be part of the acquis communtaire.51 or (1) 
to create legal rights and obligations for third parties not signatories to the 
agreement. In many instances, as with the 1975 Joint Declaration on 
conciliation procedure, the act may operate satisfactorily as a matter of political 
practice while at the same time its legal effects are the subject of disagreement.52
VI CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENTS AND LIMITS
The increasing use of interinstitutional agreements is due partly to structural 
factors of the EU system, such as the lack of a clear division of power or 
detailed rules governing relations among institutions.53 It also stems however 
from conjunctural factors, such as the partial merger of the concepts of 
subsidiarity and proportionality in the interpretation given to the concept of 
subsidiarity by the EU institutions following the signing of the Maastricht
50 Cf. ibid, at 315.
51 Cf. ibid, at 310.
32 See A. C. Oosterman-Meulenbeld, 'Die concertatie procedure en het Europese 
Parlement', (1986) NJB 1986 742, and Bothe 'Soft law in den Europâischen Gemeinschaft' in 
Festschrift ftir Hans-Jürgen Schlochauer. W. de Gruyter, Berlin, 1981, pp 761-775 at 767, 
cited in Wellens and Borchardt, 'Soft Law in European Community Law', (1989) 14 European 
Law Review at 317-318.
53 For an early view, see J. Megret et al, 1-e droit de la Communauté économique 
européenne, vol. 9. L'Assemblée, le Conseil, la Commission, le Comité économique et social. 




























































































Treaty.54 Together these factors raise serious constitutional problems. They 
include not only the 'paradox of subsidiarity'55 but also the extent to which 
interinstitutional agreements are subject to clear constitutional requirements and 
limits.56
The institutions signatory to interinstitutional agreements are subject to the basic 
principles expressed in and derived from the basic Treaties. In addition, the 
agreements themselves must be consistent with these principles.
First, in concluding agreements and in making them operate in practice the 
signatory institutions are subject to the duty of loyal cooperation expressed in 
Article 5 EC.57
Second, and consequently, interinstitutional agreements cannot modify the basic 
Treaties or secondary legislation. As stated by Advocate-General Mancini, 'it 
remains nevertheless undeniable that joint declarations and similar measures 
merely constitute "droit de complément" which may not derogate from primary
54 See, in particular, Commission of the European Communities, The Principle of 
Subsidiarity, Communication of the Commissin to the Council and the European Parliament, 
SEC(92)1990 final (Brussels, 27 October 1992); Conclusions of the Presidency, European 
Council in Edinburgh, 11-12 December 1992, Annex I to Part A, 'Overall Approach to the 
Application by the Council of the Subsidiarity Principle and Article 3b of the Treaty on 
European Union'.
55 See Snyder, 'Soft Law and Institutional Practice in the European Community', in S.
1994), pp 197-225 at 202-203. ^
56 For a partial discussion, see Wellens and Borchardt, 'Soft Law in European 
Community Law' (1989) 14 European Law Review 267 at 304 et seq.




























































































law on pain of invalidity.'58
Third, interinstitutional agreements must be consistent with the principle of legal 
certainty. In particular, any rights and obligations which are granted or imposed 
by an agreement, whether with regard to the signatory institutions or third 
parties, should be clearly and unambiguously expressed. In other words, it may 
be suggested that, in the absence of clear language an agreement should be 
interpreted as being without legal force, then only secondly as creating legal 
obligations as between the signatory institutions, and only subsequently as 
creating rights and duties vis-à-vis third parties.
Fourth, assuming that the signatory institutions have expressed their intentions 
in sufficiently clear language, they are to be bound by the principle of legitimate 
expectations. In some instances also this principle may apply as regards third 
parties, in particular the Member States. In this respect it is important that 
interinstitutional agreements may be based, directly or indirectly, on Article 4 
EC.
Fifth, the discretionary power of the EU institutions to conclude interinstitutional 
agreements is limited by the separation of powers among institutions. The 
Court of Justice must therefore make sure that in the context of inter-institutional 
cooperation the institutions do not ignore the rules of law and do not exercise
58 Case 204/86 Greece v Council [1988] ECR 5323 at 5349. The same point appears to 
be expressed, though in a slightly different way, by Bernhardt, The Sources of Community 
Law: The 'Constitution' of the Community', pp 69-82 in Commission of the European 
Communities, Thirty Years of Community Law. Luxembourg, Office of Official Publications 




























































































their discretionary power in a manifestly wrong or arbitrary way.'59
VII PROPOSALS FOR REFORM
In the light of the preceding discussion, it is possible to advance several 
proposals for reform concerning interinstitutional agreements.
It may be suggested, first, that the rank of interinstitutional agreements in the 
hierarchy of EC acts should be clarified. This is especially important in the light 
of the potential changes in the relation between the supranational and the 
intergovernmental parts of the Maastricht Treaty, and also of the potential future 
enlargement of the Community.
Second, the use of interinstitutional agreements should be authorised by the 
Treaty with regard to specified areas, such as the budgetary procedure. The 
procedure for the adoption of these authorised agreements should be made clear, 
for example in a declaration annexed to the Treaty and/or in the institutional 
rules of procedure. Again with regard to these authorised agreements, the power 
of judicial review by the European Court or Justice should be expressly 
confirmed.
Third, the types of interinstitutional agreements should be clarified and, if 
possible, a limited number of broad categories should be defined. This 
definition could be provided in a declaration annexed to the Treaty. The legal




























































































effects of each category should be specified, even if only in general terms.
Fourth, in the interests of transparency and democracy a list of existing 
interinstitutional agreements should be compiled. It should be kept up to date by 
means of an obligation on the part of the institutions to maintain the file. A 
catalog giving a list and the full text of these agreements should be published 
periodically by the Official of Official Publications.
VII CONCLUSION
The reasons for the use and proliferation of interinstitutional agreements in the 
EU legal and political order are easy to understand. With the increasing 
complexity of the EU and the urgent demands for greater transparency and 
democracy, however, it is necessary to reconsider the legitimate role of these 
agreements, their different forms and the constitutional limitations on their use. 
This report has presented an overview of existing and proposed agreements, 
suggested a simple but workable typology for classifying them, and in the light 
of certain constitutional requirements advanced several proposals for reform. Its 
aim has been to contribute to the review of EU and EC acts prior to and during 
the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference. This review should of necessity take 
account not only of acts which are legally binding in the traditional sense but 
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IX LIST OF INTERINSTITUTIONAL AGREEMENTS
(based on sources cited in the Bibliography and not complete especially for 
the period before 1984)
1 'Luns' procedure, Minutes of the Council of 24 and 25 February 1964, 
S/861/63 (not published)
2 consultation of Parliament by the Council in cases not provided for in the 
EEC Treaty: based on a statement by the President of the Council in 
answer to a Parliamentary question
3 the Council’s commitment to inform Parliament about the follow-up given 
to its opinion: based on letters of the chairmen of the Council, EP Doc. 
1-207/81, 27 May 1981, Annex
4 'Westerterp' procedure, Council Note of 16 October 1973, R/2641/73 (not 
published)
5 Joint Declaration on a conciliation procedure between Council, 
Commission and European Parliament, OJ 1975 C89/1
6 Joint Declaration on Fundamental Rights, OJ 1977 C103/1
7 Joint Declaration by the European Parliament, the Council and the 
Commission on various measures to improve the budgetary procedure of 
30 June 1982, OJ 1982 C l94/1
8 Commission's commitment to inform Parliament about the follow-up of 
parliamentary initiatives: letter of March 3 1983, see COM(81)581 final; 
EP Doc. 1-328/84/Rev., 23 May 1984
9 Joint Declaration on Racism and Xenophobia, OJ 1986 C158/1
10 Interinstitutional Agreement of 29 June 1988 on Budgetary Dscipline and 
Improvement of the Budgetary Procedure, OJ 1988 L185/33
11 Interinstitutional Declaration of 25 October 1993 on democracy, 
transparency and subsidiarity, OJ 1993 C329/133, also in Europe, no. 




























































































12 Draft Interinstitutional Agreement on procedures for implementing the 
principle of subsidiarity, OJ 1993 C329/135
13 Decision of the European Parliament on the regulations nd general 
conditions governing the Ombudsman's duties, OJ 1993 C329/136
14 Arrangements for the proceedings of the Conciliation Committee under 
Article 189B, OJ 1993 C329/141
15 Interinstitutional Agreement on budgetary discipline and improvement of 
the budgetary procedure, OJ 1993 C351/1
16 Draft Interinstitutional Agreement on the rules for implementing [the 
conciliation committee in the co-decision procedure], Commission, 
SEC(94)645 final, Brussels, 19 April 1994
17 Interinstitutional Agreement on the consolidation of Community law,
concluded at the Interinstitutional Conference, 20 December 1994, 
reported Europe, no. 6402 (n.s.), Friday 20 January 1995 p 12, cf also 
European Parliament, Committee on Legal Affairs and Citizens' Rights, 
Report on an interinstitutional agreement on official codification of 
Community legislation (Rapporteur: Jean-Pierre Cot) (European
Parliament, Session Documents, PE 211.041/fin., 12 January 1995
18 Proposed Interinstitutional Agreement aimed at making the Treaty revision 
procedure more democratic and more transparent, noted in Europe, no. 
6413 (ns), 4 February 1995, p 4
19 draft interinstitutional agreement sent in December 1993 from the 
European Parliament to the Council and the Commission on the 
implementation of Common Foreign and Security Policy
20 draft interinstitutional agreement sent in December 1993 from the 
European Parliament to the Council and the Commission on the 
application of Title VI TEU (Cooperation in the fields of Justice and 
Home Affairs)
21 draft interinstitutional agreement sent in December 1993 from the 
European Parliament to the Council and the Commission on the 
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